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Introduction
How and why images that states and their leaders have toward others
change in foreign policy? Literature on psychology, notably on confirmation bias,
state that in general, people stick with preconceived ideas that they have in their
mind, and they always accept information that support their beliefs, while reject
information that contradicts them.1 And confirmation bias, in turn, affects how a
state conducts its foreign policy – that in general, there will always be
continuation in a state’s foreign policy, unless there is a systemic shock, caused
by dramatic changes in the power distribution.2
In the mid-1980s, though, during the years preceding the restoration of
diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and China, there was not a dramatic
change in the power distribution in the region. Yes, the Soviet Union was
collapsing and it would finally be dissolved in December 1991. But at that time, it
was unclear if the Cold War was going to be over. The collapse of the Berlin Wall
that heralded the end of the Cold War was an accident; unplanned opening that
caught everyone, including both the United States and the Soviet Union,  off
guard.3
Thus, the answer could only be explained through domestic factors,
notably on the role Suharto as the main decision-maker of Indonesian foreign
1 Elizabeth Kolbert, “Why Facts don’t Change Minds,” The New Yorker, February 27, 2017
(https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds)
2 Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2000) 237
3 Mary Elise Sarotte, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall (New York: Basic
Books, 2014) xix
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policy. Suharto oversaw the collapse of Indonesia-China relationship in 1967 and
also approved the resumption of Indonesia-China relationship in 1990. Suharto
perceived China as a threat back in 1967 and as an opportunity in 1989. What this
article is going to do is to elaborate how the changes in this perception took place
by using both the first level analysis/leadership approach combined with image
theory.
Literature
This article uses the first level analysis  approach that argues the
importance of individual in a state’s foreign policy. The role of leadership in
international relations is often overlooked due to various factors, notably the idea
that structural constraints, e.g. the anarchic international system, domestic politics,
and institutional dynamics limit the ability of any leader to make any significant
contribution to international politics.4
While it is true that such structural constraints limit what leaders could do,
it is also true that the perceptions and interpretations of leaders towards
international and domestic constraints matter – that leaders define states’
international and domestic constraints, and plan strategies to ensure that they
remain in their position.5 Moreover, a state’s foreign policy is crafted not by the
entire population, but simply by its leaders and elites.6 From here, it can be
argued that a state’s action in international relations is determined by the leaders
based on their perceptions toward other states or international events. This is in
line with the concept of domestic legitimacy that assumes that it is not a state as a
whole that decides foreign policy, but it is the political elites who make and
decide foreign policy. And their main interest is to maintain their power
4 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the
Statesman Back In,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001) 108
5 Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,
Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring 1998) 126
6 Nabil Ahmad Fauzi. “Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia dan Malaysia Terhadap China Di Era
Perang Dingin.” Jurnal INSIGNIA, Vol 1, No 1 (November 2014) 14
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domestically by removing or at least reducing the risk to their security, economy
or anything else that threaten their interest.7
Furthermore, while in general states will always maintain their overall
foreign policy, changes sometimes will occur during problems in international
system. The occurrence of changes is based on how leaders perceive and interpret
the problem, and persuade states and the political elites to follow the leaders’
interpretations of the problem, leading to foreign policy changes.8
In other words, while structural constraints are important, leaders could act
to influence the structure by finding ways to push the limits of the structure based
on how much knowledge leaders accumulated, which in turn, will be utilized to
persuade the political elite to change their perceptions, which lead to changes in
leaders’ and institution’s perception toward other state or a certain event.9 And
international problems often present the opportunity for changes that a good and
ambitious leader could exploit.
And leader’s view toward problems and other states is not based on
something objective, but more on their image toward other states, international
system, and the problem itself.10
While there are many models of images in international relations, this
article focuses on the five ideal-typical image model as elaborated by Herrmann
and Fischerkeler in their article, “Beyond The Enemy Image and Spiral Model,”
notably the enemy image, degenerate image, colony image, imperialist image and
ally image.11 These five images is based on three dimensions: the perception of
the decision maker toward other state’s intention, relative power, and cultural
dimension.12
7 Fauzi (2014) 14
8 Pradana (2016) 30
9 Hafid Adim Pradana, “Persepsi Suharto dan Perubahan Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia
terhadap Cina pada Awal Orde Baru,” Indonesian Perspective, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January-June, 2016).
10. Pradana (2016) 29
11 Richard K. Herrmann dan Michael P. Fischerkeller. “Beyond the Enemy Imag and Spiral Model
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The most important element among the three is the perception toward
other state, where leaders and political elites perceive whether other state has
friendly or hostile intention, and whether there are threats or opportunities for
exploitation or at least a friendly, mutually benefiting cooperation in their
interaction with the other state.
Then, relative power based  on military strength influences a state’s
decision to take or discard possible actions toward others. For instance, when a
state sees the other state as weaker than itself, then the former would see more
possibilities of actions to impose its will toward others since the weaker state
obviously has fewer resource in its disposal to take actions in reprisal. In contrast,
a state will be far more careful in its interaction with a much stronger state due to
the possibility of economic or military reprisals.
The final dimension is the cultural dimension, whereas strategic choice
toward threats, their view of the window of opportunity and relative power is
determined by their evaluation toward other’s culture and norms, such as the norm
of anti-violence or the need for a state in dealing with other states that it consider
as equal or culturally similar to justify its actions in legal terms.
The three dimensions in turn lead to five ideal-typical image of a state
toward other states. First, the enemy image sees other actor or state as a threat, or
at least having a hostile intention, with equal level of power and capability, and
culture. Second, the degenerate image sees other state or actor has almost similar
capability but lower in the level of culture, making it possible for the former to
exploit the latter, or at least the former expand its influence to dominate the latter.
Third, the colony image sees other state as much weaker in capability, and also
much lower in culture, giving the former a huge opportunity to exploit and
dominate it. Imperialist image sees actor or foreign state as equal in culture, but
far much stronger, and more importantly, as a constant and intense threat that
would always try to dominate the former should any opportunity arises. Finally,
the ally image sees other state as equal in both culture and capability, but always
has or provides the opportunity for mutually benefiting cooperation.
93
Jurnal Academia Praja Volume 2 No 1 – Februari 2019
Based on five image elaborated by Herrmann and Fischerkeller, a leader
then would perceive other states based on their actions, capabilities and culture,
whether the other state is an enemy, a degenerate, a colony, an imperialist, or an
ally, which would influence how a leader sees a problem and possible actions that
it can take toward the problem. The changes in image happen when one of the
three dimensions that influence the image changes. And that is the role of a leader,
notably in presenting the other state, whether the other is a friend or a threat. And
the perception of the image itself can change due to changes in balance of power
which influence relative strength of each state, and due to foreign policy actions
of the other state, which increase the leader’s knowledge of the intention of other
states, and in turn affect the image of the other state.
The Collapse of Indonesia-China Relationship
The breakdown in diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and China
was marked with Indonesia closing its embassy in Beijing on October 23, 1967,
followed by China’s closure of its embassy in Jakarta on October 30, 1967.13 The
main reason for the breakdown was due to the Communist coup in 1965, which
the Indonesian army believed was supported by the Chinese, even though there
was little evidence that support that accusation.14
In the aftermath of the rebellion, Suharto managed to seize control of the
government from President Sukarno. When he seized control, though, he found
that Indonesia was in a dire strait. The economy had collapsed, with inflation hit
1,500% in mid-1966.15 Therefore, Suharto’s main goals in the beginning of his
administration were to maintain both political stability, and closely linked to that,
economic growth.
13 H. Hill and D. Narjoko. “Normalization of China-Indonesia’s diplomatic relations and the role
of the mianzi concept,” Wacana, Vol. 14 No. 2 (October 2012). 466.
14 Michael Williams, “China and Indonesia Make up: Reflections On A Troubled Relationship,”
Indonesia (Special Issue, July 1991) 150
15 Jonathan Temple, “Growing into Trouble: Indonesia after 1966,” In Dani Rodrik, In Search of
Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003) 159
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In term of political stability, the new Indonesian government was wary
about the latent threat from the communists. Even though the Indonesia
Communist Party was banned and destroyed, with its supporters massacred or
exiled, the Indonesian government remained wary from what it perceived as the
latent threat of communism. And it saw China, which it considered to be the main
supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party, as a major threat toward its
existence.16 Most Indonesian leaders viewed China as “aggressive” and “a serious
threat to Indonesia,” with navy  officers concerned about “invading forces
launched from Hainan Island.”17
And Suharto as the leader of the Indonesian government played a major
role in shaping Indonesia’s policy towards China. Under Suharto, the Indonesian
government was heavily influenced by three major actors: President Suharto
himself, the Army, and bureaucracy, in which the top of the bureaucracy was
controlled by Suharto himself.18 In this period, there was a strong linkage between
Suharto and the Army, leading a pattern in Indonesian bureaucracy that the
bureaucracy had to be obedient and served the highest authority in the land: the
President himself.
Thus, the perception of Suharto as the head of government matters and
influenced the image of Indonesian government toward China. And Suharto saw
China as a threat for the existence of both Indonesia and the longevity of his
government. As Mochtar Kusumaatmaja noted, the rebellion was basically
traumatized Suharto, resulting Suharto to harbor wound and fear toward China,
and that influenced Suharto’s foreign policy toward China.19 This was evident in
1973 when Suharto declared that he would consider normalizing Indonesia’s
relationship with China if China would surrender the elites of the Indonesian
16 Evan A. Laksmana, “Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8, no. 3 (2012): 251–70.
17 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian foreign policy and the dilemma of dependence (Cornell:
Cornell University Press, 1976) 93-94
18 Budi Rajab , Negara Order Baru : Berdiri di Atas Sistem Ekonomi dan Politik yang rapuh,
Jurnal Sosiohumaniora, Vol. 6, No. 3, (November 2004.)Hlm 192
19 Steven Erlanger. “Normaliizing of Relations by China and Indonesia Ends a Two-Decade
Feud”. The New York Times. 1989. (www.nytimes.com/1989/02/26/world/normalizing-of-
relations-by -china-and-indonesia-ends-a-two-decade-feud.html )
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Communist Party, whom Indonesia believed was hidden and protected by
Beijing.20 In other words, the new Indonesian government perceived China as an
imperialist, bend on Indonesian destruction by  utilizing its domestic agents,
notably local Chinese and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), to spread the
ideology of communism to replace Pancasila. And as long as China harbored and
protected the elites of Indonesian Communist Party, China was basically
confirming Indonesia’s suspicions.
Normalization of Indonesia-China relationship
Generally, the changes in direction of a state’s foreign policy happened
due to political shocks as noted above – including the changing of the leadership
of the state. And with Suharto’s deep distrust toward China, it was thought that
there would not be any  rapproachment between Indonesia and China under
Suharto and any attempt to restore diplomatic ties would have to wait until
Indonesia’s third president took office.21
Yet Indonesia normalized its diplomatic relations with China in August
1990.22 This obviously led to a question, why Indonesia ended up patching its
relationship with China even though President Suharto remained at the helm, and
as noted above, Indonesia saw China as an enemy? This was influenced by the
changing of perception of Suharto toward China, which in turn affected the image
of China for Suharto personally and Indonesia as a whole.
First, there was the problem of economy. In the 1980s, Indonesia saw
major economic problem when the global price of oil collapsed. As oil comprised
the bulk of Indonesia’s export, 23 this led to large trade and budget deficit that
20 Leo Suryadinata. Indonesia-China Relations : A Recent Breakthrough. Asian Suvery Vol. 30,
No. 7 (Jul., 1990), Hlm. 685
21 Williams (1991) 146
22 Dutha Freindensan, Diplomasi Yang Dilakukan Oleh Indonesia Terhadap Klaim Republik Rakyat
China (Rrc) Di Laut China Selatan (Kepulauan Natuna), Undergraduate Thesis, Fakultas Ilmu
Sosial dan Ilmu Politik UMY, 2017
23 Loc. Cit. Storey.
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threatened Indonesia’s economic growth.24 The low price of oil was further
exacerbated by Indonesia’s inefficient trade management that Indonesia’s exports
were often done not directly to its trade partner, but through third countries, such
as Singapore or Hong Kong, leading to higher cost in trading and inefficiencies.
The large trade and budget deficit led Suharto to worry that they would cause
economic crisis and would threaten the stability of Suharto’s government.25
Suharto realized that Indonesia had to expand its economy  further,
reducing its reliance to oil, and focusing on non-gas export. Therefore, Indonesia
needed to find new opportunities and new market for Indonesia’s non-gas
commodities.26
And China was the land of opportunity for Indonesia’s non-gas exports.
Before, in the 1970s due to China’s economic weaknesses, China had nothing to
offer that would benefit Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia could simply ignore China.
With the changing of leadership in China, however, the 1980s was marked by
economic booms due to successful economic reforms, with Deng Xiao Ping at the
helm, setting China on the path of strong economic growth, marked by significant
increase in GDP.27 With China’s growing economic strength, however, China had
more to offer for Indonesia, especially as a destination for Indonesia’s export, and
could help Indonesia escaping its economic slump.28 And with the bulk of trade
between Indonesia and China was handled by third parties such as Hong Kong
and Singapore as noted above, there were growing calls from Indonesia’s business
community that the direct trade between Indonesia and China should be
resumed.29
Not surprisingly, Suharto concluded that Indonesia needed to reestablish
contact with China, notably on trade issues. And unlike Sukarno, Suharto realized
24 Iam James Storey. “Indonesia’s China Policy in the New Order and Beyond : Problems and
Prospects” Contemporary Southesat Asia Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2000). Hlm 149.
25 Ni’mah Afifah. “Politik Luar negeri Indonesia Era Orde Baru Tinjauan Developing Country
Suatu Telaah Awal”. Aplikasia Vol X, No. 2 Desember 2009. Hlm. 302.
26 Hal Hill and Dionisius Narjoko, “Managing industrialisation in a Globalising Economy :
Lessons from the Soeharto Era”, pp 49-66. Hlm 52
27 Wayne M. Morrison. China’s Economic Rise : History, Trends, Challenges, and implications
for te United States. Congressional Research Service. 2018.
28. Loc.cit. Storey. Hlm. 147
29 Williams (1991) 154
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that Indonesia was missing a big deal by not engaging with China economically.
Suharto was an expert in taking every opportunity due to his expertise in raising
funds to maintain the welfare of troops under his command. In the 1950s, it was
very common that troops were unpaid due to the central government’s lack of
funds. As a result, commanders had to get their own funds and resources to
maintain the welfare of people under their command – and securing their
subordinates’ loyalty.30 Therefore, it is not surprising that Suharto was attuned to,
and far more sensitive in dealing with economic problems. And with Indonesia’s
economy in trouble, working out Indonesia’s differences with China seemed to be
an easy way out.
Moreover, there was also a change in China’s attitude toward Indonesia. A
critical element in the rupture of Indonesia’s relationship with China was the
feeling of Suharto that China’s diplomatic representatives in Indonesia was seen
as not friendly in the aftermath of the Communist Rebellion of 1965, and did not
immediately acknowledge Suharto’s new administration, instead, calling it as a
“Fascist regime.”31
Following the triumph of North Vietnam in the Vietnam War in 1975 and
the withdrawal of the United States from Southeast Asia after the United States
normalized its relationship with China under Nixon and Carter, Suharto rethought
Indonesia’s strategic priorities. Without a diplomatic relationship with China,
Indonesia was basically put in disadvantage diplomatically. At the same time,
China also toned down its rhetoric toward Indonesia and even supported
Indonesia’s attempt to be recognized as an archipelagic state, which culminated in
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. Therefore,
President Suharto in March 1978 declared that Indonesia was preparing ways to
reestablish a diplomatic relationship with China, 32
30 Devin Jenkins, “One Reasonably Capable Man : Soeharto’s Early Fundraising” in Edward
Aspinal and Greg Fealy. Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy (Australis: ANU E Press, 2010) 18-
31 Williams (1991) 150
32 Ibid. 151, 153
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At the same time, there remained fears among Indonesians on China’s
intention, which was confirmed when China decided to invade Vietnam in
February 1979. For Indonesian military especially, this confirmed that China
remained a threat and would readily expand their power should opportunities
arise.33 Thus, Indonesia was put in a dilemma: there was a desire for Indonesia to
take the advantage of China’s economic reforms, which remained elusive due to
the lack of diplomatic rapproachment. Yet, it remained wary about China. Not
surprisingly, while there were progresses in Indonesia-China relations, it remained
limited. In November 1984, for instance, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja stated that Indonesia would develop trade relations with China,
but also stressed that it was not normalization in diplomatic relationship.
Diplomatic normalization would be done carefully, in progression, with building
trade relations as a step in this direction.34
Still, the 1980s was marked by further reduction in the diplomatic tension
between Indonesia and China. For China, it would try to be friendly as long as
Jakarta did not actively oppose China on major issues. Moreover, by 1980s, even
though nobody expected the end of the cold war, the relationship between the
United States, China and the Soviet Union kept improving, which threatened to
leave out Indonesia.35
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja knew and worried that Suharto still distrustful
toward China. But by the end of the day, economic considerations, supported by
the reduction in the tension in international system, won the day. Suharto ended
up approving the trade relationship by issuing Presidential Instruction Number
9/1985, providing a guide toward Indonesia-China trade relationship on Juli 23,
1985.
Moreover, in this normalization process, Indonesia also signed a
Memorandum of Understanding between Indonesia and China that basically
33 Ibid. 152
34 F. Arista, Suwirta dan Farida Sarimaya, “Perbandingan Kebijakan Adam Malik, Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja dan Ali Alatas terhadap Politik Luar Negeri Bebas Aktif Indonesia Pada Masa
Orde Baru,” FACTUM, Volume 6, no. 1 (April 2017_ Hlm. 77
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signaled Indonesia’s agreement with One China Policy between President Suharto
dan China Prime Minister Li Peng. Furthermore, on Agustus 8, 1990 Li Peng
visited Indonesia and Suharto returned the favor by visiting China on November
14, 1990.36
Here basically Suharto’s perspective toward China had changed from
enemy to ally image, where Indonesia saw opportunities for further cooperation
with China, and seeing China no longer a major threat as it was back in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Conclusion
Perception of a leader toward other state is never set in stone. Instead,
there is still possibility of changes when leaders absorb new information regarding
the world and other states. And this perception is influenced by several major
factors, notably external factors, such as the development in international s ystem
and domestic politics, as happened in Indonesia under Suharto administration.
Under Suharto, Indonesia’s foreign policy toward China could change.
Despite the fact that the diplomatic relationship between China and Indonesia was
frozen under Suharto, Suharto himself also normalized the relationship between
China and Indonesia. And this shows that the foreign policy  of a state is
influenced by how leaders perceive other states in certain situation and conditions.
The changing in China’s attitude toward Indonesia, changing economic
fortunes of China, and changing in international environment became new
information that affected Suharto’s perception on China, and thus changing
Suharto’s attitude, from non-compromising and trying to contain the influence of
China, into normalizing Indonesia’s relations with China.
36 Arista et al (2017) 79
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